Reflections on Nuremberg by Tuerkeimer, Frank
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2017
Reflections on Nuremberg
Frank Tuerkeimer
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank Tuerkeimer, Reflections on Nuremberg, 39 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 25 (2017).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol39/iss1/3
REFLECTIONS ON NUREMBERG MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/17 7:24 PM 
 
25 
 Reflections on Nuremberg 
 FRANK TUERKHEIMER 
Louise Arbor, former chief prosecutor for the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda war crimes tribunals remarked that, “collectively . . . we’re 
linked to Nuremberg. We mention its name every single day.”1 With the 
passage of seventy years since the International Military Tribunal 
(“IMT”) announced its verdicts and pronounced its sentences much in 
the world has changed and the contour of international criminal law, 
founded in Nuremberg, has expanded enormously. Nevertheless, Nu-
remberg is still a point of reference, reverence and reflection. 
I. AN AMAZING FEAT IN THE HISTORY OF TRIALS 
That reflection begins with a statement of pure and basic awe.  As 
a trial lawyer who has tried complex criminal and civil cases in New 
York City, Washington, DC and Madison, Wisconsin, I have some idea 
of what it takes to prepare a case. To me, the most astounding accom-
plishment in the long history of trials is what the Nuremberg prosecu-
tors were able to do in the short time between the end of the war in Eu-
rope in early May, 1945 and the Fall of that year when they were ready 
for and began the trial. 
First, the charges they brought were the first of their kind, brought 
under various treaties, pacts and protocols. It was obvious that the de-
fense counsel would vigorously attack the novelty of the prosecution, 
and they had to prepare to defend the theory of the charges. Further-
more, there was considerable depth to the charges brought by the Allies. 
Largely at the initiative of a War Department (soon to be renamed as the 
Defense Department) lawyer, Murray Bernays, the Nuremberg charter 
contemplated more than just the one trial. 
Bernays, and his colleagues, envisioned a massive post-war effort 
at dealing with German criminality. Appreciating that it would be im-
possible to reinvent the wheel at every trial of every death camp prison 
 
 1. JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE 
TRIBUNAL 18 (2003) (quoting Louise Arbor). 
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guard, Bernays suggested that the various Nazi organizations such as 
the SS, the Gestapo and the SD be charged as criminal organizations 
and that in subsequent trials, if the organization had been found guilty 
as charged in the Nuremberg indictment, all the prosecution would have 
to show was membership in the organization and then it would be up to 
the defendant to show either his unawareness of its illegal objectives or 
his non-culpable role in it. His suggestion was adopted in the Nurem-
berg Charter. The IMT Tribunal added slightly to the prosecution bur-
den and found these organizations were in fact criminal organizations, 
thus paving the path to the kinds of prosecutions Bernays and his col-
leagues had contemplated.  While some of the defendants in the later 
Nuremberg trials were charged under this theory, no one was charged 
solely with membership in a criminal organization. After the Nurem-
berg trials ended the concept was not applied—a great idea with no lon-
gevity.2 Why that is so will be discussed later. 
Aside from theory, there was considerable practical work to be 
done. The United States, which might be said to have carried the labor-
ing oar in the case, still did not work alone and agreement on virtually 
all matters had to be reached with the partners in the prosecution—the 
British, the French, and the Soviets. Aside from the language problems 
attended to the resolution of issues, prosecutors from different countries, 
especially the Soviets, saw things differently and these differences had 
to be worked out, almost invariably through multiple interpreters as 
very few, if any of the prosecutors, spoke French, English and Russian. 
And these differences were not minor: for example, the French and 
Russians were reluctant to use conspiracy law, an alien concept to their 
systems. The United States and the United Kingdom prevailed and a 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war became part of the IMT Charter and 
the first count of the indictment. 
Legal considerations, ponderous and novel as they were, were the 
least of it. The prosecutors had to get the facts, the witnesses, and the 
documents necessary to prove charges of aggressive war, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity against two-dozen defendants. There was 
no such thing as collective guilt; the case had to be proved separately as 
to each defendant.  Nothing underscores this better than the acquittal of 
 
 2. Ironically, in 2015, the German courts adopted a somewhat similar concept: participa-
tion in the administration of a death camp was presumptively complicity in murder. Former See 
Auschwitz Guard Goes on Trial in Germany, THE GUARDIAN, April 21, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/apr/21/former-auschwitz-guard-goes-on-trial-in-
germany-video. While the Bernays idea could have been applied to thousands had the will been 
there, this similar approach may be applied half a dozen times, if at all, given its belated birth 
seventy years after Nuremberg.  
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three of the defendants. Significantly, the technology they had was light 
years from what we have today where a document in any part of the 
world can be scanned and sent anywhere in a matter of seconds. Docu-
ments from other cities in Germany or nearby countries had to be flown 
from and to hastily constructed airports since German airports had been 
thoroughly bombed. If taken by courier or jeep, the documents had to be 
driven on bombed out roads, thus making speed almost impossible. 
There had to be an agreement as to which witnesses to call, in what 
order, and of course how the case would be divided among the four 
powers. Then, when all this was done, documents, which were mostly in 
German, had to be translated into English, Russian and French. A doc-
ument in one of those three languages had to be translated into the other 
two and, of course, into German. Documents to be placed into evidence 
had to be made ready for review by defense counsel to avoid endless 
and needless hassles on authenticity. But, above all, there had to be an 
effort at consistency with respect to what was to be shown and what was 
not. 
Witnesses had to be prepared, both for their direct examination and 
for anticipated cross-examination. Cross-examination of the defendants 
had to be prepared as well. All this was a colossal job requiring endless 
hours under a pressure cooker environment. In short, the burdens on the 
prosecution team were unprecedented: their time was limited, and the 
knowledge that all moves would be subject to international scrutiny, to 
say nothing of the scrutiny of history, only added to the pressure. Yet 
they pulled it off. Despite all obstacles, when the time came for trial 
they were ready to present the most significant case in the history of tri-
als and their preparation was almost flawless.3 
 
 
 
 
 3. In a slightly different context, it has been said that “perfection in trials will not be at-
tained so long as human beings conduct them.” U.S. v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 485 (2nd Cir. 
1963). A similar shortfall from perfection attends most human undertakings, including the mas-
sive effort by the Nuremberg prosecutors to bring to justice some of the greatest criminals in his-
tory. In their case, that shortfall was the indictment of the wrong Krupp. Krupp Industries benefit-
ted enormously from slave labor to the knowledge of its leadership. The Nuremberg prosecutors 
charged the elder Krupp, Gustav Krupp, instead of his son, Alfred Krupp, and by the time they 
discovered their mistake, it was too late to substitute the younger Krupp for his father who was 
quickly dropped from the case because of the infirmities of old age. If the trial were to go ahead 
with Alfred Krupp, it would have entailed a delay that no one on the prosecution side favored. 
Thus, he was not one of the indicted defendants. Alfred Krupp was charged in one of the later 
Nuremberg cases, convicted, sentenced to twelve years imprisonment and then pardoned after 
serving three years. 
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II. JUSTICE JACKSON’S CROSS EXAMINATION OF HERMAN GÖRING 
Justice Jackson, in preparing his cross-examination of the main de-
fendant, Herman Göring, did what most trial lawyers do: he outlined his 
questions which were mainly questions that could be answered with a 
“yes” or a “no” and plotted subsequent questions on that basis. The 
whole strategy fell apart when the presiding judge permitted Göring to 
expand on his answers when asked a question that could have been an-
swered with just a “yes” or a “no.” This cramped a good part of the 
cross-examination and made it appear as if Göring got the best of Jack-
son because by the time Göring finished his answer, a follow-up ques-
tion was more difficult to ask. Once this process was repeated, the court 
giving Göring the latitude of expanding on his answers, it appeared that 
Jackson’s cross-examination was not going well. 
This is not complicated. In a non-jury case—and all the Nurem-
berg trials were non-jury trials—if the court, once it hears the prosecu-
tion’s case and the defendant’s testimony, concludes the defendant is 
guilty, it will often relax the rules of evidence on cross-examination of 
the defendant and give the defendant greater latitude in answering ques-
tions.  This was not a particularly difficult decision in Göring’s case 
since his footprints were all over the plans for aggressive war (Counts 
One and Two) and war crimes (Count Three). As to crimes against hu-
manity (Count Four) the evidence there was explosive: Göring had, in a 
written memorandum, to the head of the Main Security Office of the 
Reich on July 31, 1941—at about the time when virtually all of Europe-
an Jewry was under the control of Germany and its allies—telling him 
he was responsible for and to obtain the cooperation of other govern-
ment agencies in putting into effect the Final Solution to the Jewish 
Question. This document placed Göring at the heart of the Holocaust, a 
part of count four, and it was hardly necessary to show more. 
In sum, by the time the judges heard Göring’s testimony after the 
evidence against him had come in, they obviously decided that he was 
guilty and they did what many judges do in such circumstances—they 
gave him great leeway in answering while being cross-examined, if for 
no other reason, so he could at least feel he was given a fair shot at deal-
ing with the prosecution’s evidence.4 
Perhaps Justice Jackson expected more deference from the court 
on his cross-examination of Göring. But the prosecutor’s ego is not or-
dinarily something the court takes into account in making evidentiary 
 
 4. Normally, the opportunity to expand on a “yes” or “no” answer given on cross-
examination comes on redirect examination. 
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rulings and the Nuremberg tribunal certainly did not. Jackson did not 
flounder; his cross-examination of Göring did not go as planned be-
cause his case was too strong. If Jackson is to be faulted, it is for not 
cutting the cross-examination once it was apparent what was happening. 
But that was a difficult alternative in a case such as this and criticism 
for not aborting the cross-examination is unwarranted. 
III. FRITZ SAUKEL/ALBERT SPEER 
Fritz Saukel was the defendant running the slave labor program.5 
Saukel violated the rules of war relating to the treatment of civilian 
populations in occupied territory by administering a program which im-
permissibly removed civilian populations from their homes, using them 
for work while underfeeding and inadequately housing them, virtually 
assuring that many would not survive. They were literally worked to 
death. Saukel never acknowledged his guilt and before his execution he 
proclaimed his innocence and railed against what he called an unjust 
verdict. 
Saukel’s responsibility entailed responding to the demands of Ar-
maments Minister Albert Speer. As Armaments Minister, Speer was, 
essentially, Saukel’s boss and told Saukel exactly how many workers he 
needed and where. Speer, unlike Saukel, was erudite, suave and savvy, 
and had a sense of how he might thread his way through the labyrinth of 
evidence against him and avoid the hangman. Speer acknowledged his 
wrongdoing, he regretted it, but he managed to do so in a way that reso-
nated with the judges. It was the same ability to judge and play people 
that had caused him to become close to Hitler. Speer was found guilty 
and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, a sentence he served and 
then went on for fifteen years to live a productive life as a writer about 
the Third Reich. Speer’s articulate and persuasive contrition, totally dif-
ferent from Saukel’s persistent denials of wrongdoing, resulted in this 
inversion in sentencing. Normally, the person at the top of structured 
criminality is sentenced more severely than an underling. Not this time. 
 
 5. See generally BEN FERENZ, LESS THAN SLAVES (Harv. Univ. Press 1979) (Ferenz has 
incisively noted that the term “slave” does not accurately convey what was involved. Conven-
tionally, slaves are encouraged to reproduce so there will be another generation of slaves. That 
was certainly true in the United States with an embargo against importation of slaves having been 
passed in 1807 to go into effect in 1808. In the case of the German slave labor program, slaves 
were underfed and worked to death, to be replaced by what appeared to be an endless supply of 
slaves. In short, the slave labor program was actually a method of slow murder.).  
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IV. HANS FRANK 
Hans Frank was a leading lawyer in the Third Reich. Having 
worked closely with Hitler for years, he was appointed to head of what 
was known as the General Government in Poland. Once Poland was ful-
ly occupied by the Germans, it was divided into three parts. A small part 
was annexed to Germany, a chunk in the eastern part was separated 
from central Poland, and the remnant, most of the original Poland, was 
then designated as the General Government. Frank kept a diary—not in 
the sense of regular evening entries—but rather a collection of all his 
speeches, memos and official documents. By the end of the war this 
“diary” consisted of forty-three file cabinets which Frank preserved. It 
is unclear why he preserved them since they contained highly incrimi-
nating evidence. Perhaps he thought that because they reflected his nu-
merous disputes with the SS—the bad guys—they might be exculpato-
ry.  If there was anything exculpatory in these file cabinets, it was 
eclipsed by what was inculpatory. 
The diary contained a speech in which Frank spoke of the need to 
annihilate the Jews6 and a cabinet meeting in which it was decided to 
remove five hundred thousand tons of grains from Poland to Germany 
to be filled “at the expense of the . . . [Polish] population,” both evi-
dence of war crimes and crimes against humanity.7 But what is general-
ly overlooked in his Christmas 1941 speech to the German soldiers sta-
tioned in Cracow. Frank tells them to write home and assure their 
families that they are not wasting away in frigid Poland but rather are 
killing the Jews (he refers to them as “lice”). And while they cannot all 
be killed at once, Frank says, since they have been around for five thou-
sand years, with enough time, they will be annihilated.8 
This is an extraordinary document. Can it honestly be said that the 
fact of the Holocaust was unknown to the German people? Frank’s dia-
ries contain proof that soldiers in Poland were explicitly instructed by 
the head of the German government in Poland to notify their families of 
the mass destruction of Jews occurring in Poland. Presumably those so 
informed would spread the word since Frank’s directive contained no 
suggestion to keep it a secret. Had he wanted secrecy, he would not 
have told the soldiers to let their families at home know about the mass 
 
 6. Hans Frank, Remarks at the Meeting of the Government of General Government Cracow 
(Dec. 16, 1942) (transcript available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/2233-ps.asp). 
 7. Hans Frank, Remarks at the Cabinet Session in Cracow (Aug. 24, 1942) (transcript 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/2233-ps.asp). 
 8. Hans Frank, Speech of the Governor General Closing the Cabinet Session (Dec. 16, 
1942) (transcript available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/2233-ps.asp). 
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murder of Jews in the first place. This item of Nuremberg proof has not 
received the attention it deserves. 
Frank, like Speer, was also contrite, testifying that “a thousand 
years will pass and the guilt of Germany will not have been erased.”9 
But he did not play the contrition card as deftly as Speer and was sen-
tenced to death and executed. 
V. NUREMBERG PROSECUTORS 
In 1995, I attended a conference of former Nuremberg prosecutors 
at the University of South Carolina Law School in Columbia, South 
Carolina. At the time there were at least a dozen former Nuremberg 
prosecutors who attended in what was quite a reunion for many of them. 
As someone who had just begun teaching a course on Trials of the Hol-
ocaust, I was thrilled to be at there. Two points stick in my mind: one of 
at least historical interest, the other staggering. 
A. Julius Streicher 
Julius Streicher was the publisher of a notorious anti-Semitic tract 
known as Der Stürmer. At some point in the late 1930s, its circulation 
exceeded six hundred thousand, which is sizeable for a country whose 
population was about one hundred times that. No U.S. newspaper ap-
proaches the one percent in circulation figure. Its contents, authored by 
Streicher, were vile, depicting Jews as lecherous, ugly, subhuman, and 
to be feared and despised. Some of his articles were specifically di-
rected to German youth and designed to infuse anti-Semitism into their 
young minds. During the war, Streicher was either under arrest for a fi-
nancial crime or the administrative head of a German province. He had 
zero role in the Holocaust. He did, however, deny that he was aware of 
the slaughter of Jews, an assertion refuted by information contained in a 
journal he received regularly. The prosecution’s closing argument in 
Streicher’s case sounded much like the much-later published Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners by Daniel Goldhagen. The prosecutors argued that 
without the willingness of the German population to go along, the Hol-
ocaust could not have happened. Streicher’s publications, the prosecu-
tion argued, ensured that they would. The prosecutors also claimed that 
Streicher’s crime was particularly venal because the writings directed to 
children would have the effect of poisoning German youth with his rab-
 
 9. Testimony of Hans Frank (18 April 1946), XII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 
OCTOBER 1946 13 (Nuremberg 1947). 
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id anti-Semitism, ensuring its viability for at least another generation. 
The rambling defense argument included the point that was there was 
no proof of any connection between anything Streicher wrote and the 
murder of Jews. That was a correct observation. Nevertheless, the Nu-
remberg judges found Streicher guilty of crimes against humanity and 
imposed the death penalty, which was carried out. They noted and ap-
parently were somewhat influenced by the fact that he lied when he de-
nied knowledge of the murder of Jews. 
Fifty years later there was a general consensus among the at-
tendees at the conference that Streicher probably should not have been 
convicted: all he did was write and virtually all his writings antedated 
the Holocaust. They also agreed that while a defendant who lies may 
find his or her sentence increased as a result, lies such as Streicher’s 
were not proof that he was complicit in crimes against humanity. If 
Streicher had been charged under United States law—an obvious im-
possibility—he probably would have had a valid First Amendment de-
fense. 
B. Reaction at Home 
Of far broader interest was the uniform recollection of these law-
yers as to their reception on returning to the United States. These law-
yers were bright young people most of whom abandoned lucrative jobs 
with Wall Street law firms to go to Nuremberg and do the grunt work 
necessary to prepare for the IMT trial and the twelve trials conducted by 
the United States Military that followed. No one did it for the pay or the 
prestige: they did it out of a deep sense of justice and desire to be part of 
whatever meager efforts could be made to bring to justice those who 
started a war that led to over twenty-five million deaths and then com-
mitted horrific crimes during the war. 
When they returned to the United States in the late 1940s, no one 
was interested. If at a cocktail party or other social occasion someone 
asked them what they had done and they responded by referring to their 
work at Nuremberg, the questioner invariably changed the subject. Vir-
tually all the former Nuremberg prosecutors I spoke to had a similar ex-
perience. Rather, they said it was only in the past several years, roughly 
since 1990, that conferences such as this one took place and that a seg-
ment of the general public was more than anxious to hear about their 
years at Nuremberg. 
There is a significant parallel to their experiences that suggests a 
common cause. Between the end of the Second World War and 1990, 
there were only about half a dozen civil cases arising out of Second 
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World War claims. Considering all the life insurance policies held by 
victims, the many secret accounts held in the names of victims, their 
possible claims against entities such as Bayer, I.G. Farben, Krupp In-
dustries and other entities who were the beneficiaries of slave labor and 
profited enormously by virtue of minimal labor costs, this is astounding. 
Since 1990, and around the same time that these former prosecutors fi-
nally found an interest in their experiences, civil litigation arising out of 
Second World War crimes has mushroomed—cases against insurance 
companies, Swiss banks, and other trusted institutions.10 Given the time 
frames—no interest in the late 1940s and interest at last starting around 
1990—there is one plausible explanation: The Cold War. It began in the 
late 1940s when the former Nuremberg prosecutors returned home and 
ended in 1989–1990. 
Official U.S. policy during the 1950–1990 period made the Soviet 
Union our enemy, and Germany, if it was anything, was a barrier to the 
spread of communism into western Europe and hence on “our” side. 
Somehow this larger image of “enemy” and “friend” appeared to have 
made Germany’s war crimes and crimes against humanity an unpleasant 
subject as it tainted an essential ally. It was, after all, the Soviet Union 
that had taken over the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, a good chunk of Austria, and East Germany. At the 
same time, the communist parties in Italy and France regularly received 
about thirty-five percent of the vote in parliamentary elections. Germa-
ny was the bulwark, the barrier against the spread of communism. Why 
delve into the unsavory background of a critical ally? Once the Cold 
War ended, Nuremberg and all it represented safely became an object of 
great public interest. And rightly, remains so. 
 
 
 10. See generally MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR 
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS (New York Univ. Press 2003); MICHAEL R. MARRUS, 
SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE: THE HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S (Univ. of 
Wisconsin Press 2009). 
